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CORPORATE ORGANIZATION IN NEW JERSEY
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL AND GENERAL DISCUSSION
1The history of New Jersey corporations may be said to
date from the close of the Revolutionary War, in 1791 when
Alexander Hamilton, the greatest business developer of his time,
was instrumental in forming a corporation, of gigantic proportions
for the period, with the object of promoting many different
branches of industry, encouraging the "infant industries" of the
time and defending them from being destroyed before they became
self supporting. Like all early corporations, it was formed by a
special act of the state legislature. Its objects were in a small
degree developmental and philanthropic, as well as commercial.
It received the name, "Contributors to the Society for the
Establishment of Useful Manufactures," and was capitalized at one
million dollars, of which part was taken by the state, part
distributed through a lottery, as was the custom of the time, and
the remainder sold at private sale. Power was given to this
corporation to incur debts not to exceed four million dollars.
It was also permitted in certain cases to exercise the state's
power of eminent domain, and various functions which are now
given to public corporations only.
The first general corporation law was enacted in l84o,
again with a view of encouraging manufactures, and remains as the
foundations of the present system of laws under which many of the

2so-called "trusts" of today are doing business. Gradual
modifications have been made since 1346, but there have been no
radical or sudden changes. Three years after the passage of this
act, in 1849, stockholders were relieved from the burden of joint
and several liability for the amounts unpaid on their subscriptions
and were made liable only for their respective shares of the total.
Other slight modifications were made at about this time, including
provisions for the protection of creditors and the publication of
the affairs of the corporation. In 1846, the use of the corporate
form was limited to mining, manufacturing and allied industries,
but was not extended to mercantile businesses. More publicity
was required then than at present, under penalty of personal
liability. A year or two later, the restrictive provisions of the
law were in large part repealed, and advanced theories were
adopted as to the time and place of holding meetings, necessity of
residence of directors in New Jersey, access to books and maximum
of corporate indebtedness. The privilege of incorporating was
extended to "every lawful business or purpose whatever," as long
as the business was conducted in the state of New Jersey. Stock
could not be issued for other considerations than cash at this
time.
In 1875, another step in advance was taken by discontinuing
the granting of special charters to business companies, and a
general act was passed for the guidance of all would be
incorporators, great or small. In this act the principle features
of the act of 1846 and its modifications were retained, except

that so much publicity was nox required, and stock could oe issued
for property. The present 3cnedule oi fees wa3 also adopted at
this time. Until 1889, corporations had no power to own stock
in otner corporations, but in mat year tnis was reversed by
an amendment, which was passed more especially witn a view to
tne integration of corporations engaged in tne successive steps
of production of any article. Probably no law affecting modern
industrial organization has been of more importance than tnis one.
There was a general revision of tne corporation law in lc$96,
to adjust it to modern conditions wnich arc very different from
those of the previous decads. Tne most important cnange at this
time was one removal oi tne definite limit on tne term of
corporate existence, and tne provision lor issueing obligations
of various classes. Since tnen tnere nas been no general revision,
and only one or two very important cnanges. Tnese are tne statutory
provisions exempting one directors and stockholders of J\iew Jersey
corporations from personal liability arising in wew Jersey courts,
under tne corporation laws of otner states, and permitting tne
incorporators to define tne status of tne otficers, directors,
stockholders and bondholders, in tne certificate of incorporation.
'•Over naif of tne corporations of tne United States
whose size or control of industrial operations are sufficient
to denominate tnem, in popular language as "trusts" are organized
under tne laws of New Jersey. Among tnose are the United States
Steel Qorporatibn, capitalized at $1, 100, 000, 000; tne Distiller's
Securities Corporation, 32,500,000; tne American Ice Securities Com-
pany, $20,000,000; tne International harvester Company, 120,000,000,
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The American Smelting and Refining Company, $100,000,000; The
American Hide and Leather Company, f35,000, 000; The Amalmagated
Copper Company, $155,000,000 and The Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey, $100,000,000. The increase in the number of large
corporations during the past decade is due partly to the launching
of new industrial enterprises, "but more to the combination of
existing corporations and partnerships; the exchange of physical
plant or stock issues for the stocks and "bonds of the new
organization, and the abandoning of competition. The result is
fewer, and larger, corporation, which in six cases out of ten have
incorporated under the laws of the state of New Jersey. Here there
is constant definite and progressive policy, long established and
not subject to sudden change, power to hold stock of other
corporations, protection of the interests of stockholders,
bondholders and creditors without burdensome restrictions; harmful
publicity is not required, legislation is stable, directors
meetings may be held outside of the state, facilities are offered
for dissolution when desired without loss or delay, and taxation
is uniform and comparatively equitable.
Corporations have never been creatures of the common law,
but have always been formed either by a special act of some
sovereign power, or under general laws. New Jersey, like most
progressive states now has a provision in her constitution which
prohibits a special act of incorporation, and requires all to
organize under general acts. This is manifestly the best policy,
since otherwise there would be unlimited room for legislative
corruption. The present law is made up of a large number of

special laws relating to particular corporations or to particular
classes of corporations, and of a code for "business corporations
in general known as "An Act Concerning Corporations (Revision of
1896)." In that year the state legislature gave particular
attention to the subject of corporation legislation, and the
present law seems likely to endure in substantially its present
form for an indefinite period.
The corporations which are not at present organized under
the general incorporation law are principally public utilities ,and
financial, philanthropic, educational and cooperative societies.
The reason for special acts is, either that special protection is
necessary to the public interests, as in the case of banks and
insurance companies, or that the corporation may be protected from
manipulation by its more powerful members at the expense of the
weak, as is sometimes done in corporations intended to be
cooperative.
The advantages of organizing a business under corporation
laws is facility in raising large amounts of capital, permanence,
centralization of control, transferability of ownership, limited
liability and improved credit due to these advantages. There are
a few disadvantages also, which must be considered before
incorporating. These are increased payments to the state by way
of franchise or other assessments., limited power, governmental
control, and liability to manipulation by unfavorable inside
interests. Far more attention has been paid to the advantages
than to the disadvantages, because the corporate area has not nor
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will it soon reach its maximum, and no reaction has "been felt,
1. Keasfcey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations,
Buffalo, 1899.
2. New Jersey Department of State, Laws relating to
Business Companies, edition of 1910. Camden, 1910.
3. Moody's Manual, New York, 1908.
7
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CHAPTER II
INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS
"'"Intercorporate relations under the statutes of New Jersey
usually take one of two forms--control through stock ownership,
or merging of physical property under the merger act. The New
Jersey statute is peculiarly fitted to accomplish either of these
objects, and is therefore, the one most often used "by promoters
who desire to secure the advantages of the large industrial unit.
2
The natural growth of modern enterprises, whose objects
are to decrease administrative and other expenses and to avoid
destructive competition, has caused a great deal of alarm among
the people of the United States lest the second object will do
more harm, that is increase the cost of goods to the consumer,
more than the first will benefit him by decreasing the cost of
production. This fear, which is further sustained by the economic
law of monopolu price, has form in the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, in so far as interstate commerce is affected, and in a
number of state acts. These are directed principally against any
arrangement which is intended directly or indirectly to avoid
competition, reduce production or fix prices. In spite of public
and legislative objections, the tendency toward consolidations
continues and increases, and new forms of organization are devised
as the old ones are declared illegal, or it is found that they do
not sufficiently bind their members to act in unison. The holding
corporation is the logical successor of the trust, long since
declared illegal in most of its forms, and it is but another step
from the holding corporation to the one which owns the physical
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assets of its constituent companies. Unless a sufficient amount
of the stock cannot "be purchased, or the subsidiary companies own
valuable secondary franchises which cannot well be assigned, it
usually becomes advantageous to take over the physical assets
sooner or later, dissolving the subsidiary corporations and
distributing the shares of the stock of the consolidation in
exchange. The result is the same, whether the purchase is of
physical assets or of capital stock; the form of the transact ion
is immaterial from the e conomists point of view. The results
obtained by the trust, the holding company and the single
consolidated corporation are the same, as outlined above; the
avoiding of competition and the decrease of expenses through
cooperation in the use of patents and trade secrets, in
distributing product, in advertising, in administration and in
selling. It is not as yet decided if the interests of the public
are best served by combination or by competition, but we know
definitely that those of the corporation are best served by
combination, and if the combination can be effectively controlled
by the state, it is for the public interest to permit it to exist
under such control. Law must conform sooner or later to
economic conditions and these should therefore be studied before
forming a law which attempts to regulate any industry.
Adverse court decisions have not suggested to the large
corporations to change into partnerships or joint stock companies,
because it is so obviously impossible for them to do business as
such, with the resulting chaos of rights and interests and
liabilities involved. When the trusts were compelled to

re-exchange their trust certificates they sought to become a
single corporation in most cases under the laws of New Jersey,
thus attempting to clear technically themselves of the charge of
adopting the trust form for the purpose of limiting output,
fixing prices or destroying competition. The courts have made
several attempts to go back of the New Jersey consolidated
corporation on the grounds that it is a combination of competing
concerns, and are therefore violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,
and have rendered decisions against the Standard Oil Company and
the American Tobacco Company, among others, for making this change
in the form but not the fact of their make up. But these decisions
were based upon technicalities of the complex law of monopolies,
and not upon the principle to which we must look in the future
for guidance. Public sentiment has been the force behind both
the law and its execution, but in this case it is probably
misdirected and misinformed. Itt is the business of the
corporation, not the corporation that needs public regulation, if
we are to keep the advantages of monopoly production and avoid the
disadvantages of the misuse of monopoly power.
An integration, that is a combination of successive steps
in production and distribution would not be contrary to the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law, nor would a combination of non-competing
plants. There is no sound reason why corporations should not be
given the same freedom as individuals in uniting their control.
Laws covering monopolies should be general and equally appicable to
individuals and to corporations. This is the attitude of New
Jersey towards her corporations. It is similar in principle to
/
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the laissez faire policy of England which has made her the
worlds greatest mercantile nation. It is the function of the
state to control corporations only so far as they have "been given
special priviliges, such as limited liability and permanent
existence, or special primary or secondary franchises.
The great number of the large organizations which are
constantly in the public eye are consolidations formed under the
^law for the merger of corporations. When the directors of
the various corporations to be combined have agreed upon the
amount of the stocks and bonds of various classes which are to be
»
given to their respective stockholders, the proposition must be
submitted to their stockholders after twenty days notice of the
time, place and object of the meeting, and passed by a two- thirds
vote of the stockholders of each corporation. In this way the
shares of a consolidated corporation show the ratio of the
interests or capitalized net income of the constituent companies,
rather than the valuation of the property turned over by them.
Two plants may have physical property valued at the same amount,
and still receive entirely different shares of the new capitaliza-
tion, which will quite probably be far in excess of the physical
value of either. This would simply be a capitalization of good
will, and therefore not an altogether undesirable operation, were
it not that the ratio of the property of all of the plants is
often raised materially, thus injecting a quantity of "water"
into the stock. There is a theory, now taking definite form,
that as in practice a share of the capital stock of a corporation
simply represents a fraction of the aggregate ownership, it
/
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should have no ficticous face, or par value, "but should recite
upon its face simply the fractional interest that it represents
of the whole corporate property. This is one of the features of
the much talked of federal incorporation law which is now
pending in Congress, and which is also intended to do away with
the present evils of the large corporations engaged in interstate
commerce business, "by putting them under one effective control.
1. Laws relating to Eusiness Companies, edition of 1910.
2. Dill, Some Aspects of New Jersey's Corporate Policy,
Philadelphia, 1903.
/
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CHAPTER III
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
^The written instrument which first brings the corporation
out as an entity distinct from the association of men of which it
is composed is known in various localities as the deed of
settlement, articles of association, articles of incorporation,
certificate of incorporation, charter, memorandum of association
and incorporation paper. No one of these seems to fit exactly
the relation which it is desired to express, hut the term
"Certificate of Incorporation," adopted "by the New Jersey
legislature probably comes as near to expressing the contents of
the instruments as any other term, since all are open to some
criticism. Upon the filing of this paper with the Secretary of
State the corporation becomes a legal entity having all of the
powers and rights as set forth in the laws of New Jersey relating
to business companies, and many additional implied powers, which
are not mentioned in the statutes, but are derived from court
decisions, common law, and other sources. Although, as before
said, there is no possible common law corporation, the analogy
between the corporation's rights and liabilities and those of a
natural person is recognized by the courts after the corporation
is organized. It would of course be impracticable to put a
corporation in jail for a tort, since no agent could be given
power to commit a tort, and would therefore be personally
responsible. But a corporation may be fined or assessed damages
for the tort of its agent.
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"^The certificate of incorporation has a double function;
it is a private contract, within the meaning of the federal
constitution, "between the corporation and the state, between the
corporation and its stockholders and "between the individual
stockholders, and it also complies with the provisions of private
law required for the formation of "business companies in the state
of New Jersey. Notice is given, at least constructively, to
creditors, stockholders and the public of the existence of this
contract when it is filed in the office of the county recorder
of deeds in the county in which the registered office is located.
The charter of a corporation is a contract, merely in so far as
is necessary to fulfill its object, and not to secure for the
corporation immunity from the burdens and responsibility of the
pindividual. In the Dartmouth College case, one of the earliest
and most important court decisions affecting the status of
American corporations, it was held that the state could not alter,
amend or repeal the charter of a corporation, unless it had
expressly reserved this power to itself in its constitution,
statutes, or the charter of the corporation itself. This of
course does not prohibit the state from exercising police powers.
The state should not of course create an institution which it
cannot control effectively, and the constitutions which have been
drawn up or revised since this decision was rendered have nearly
all profited by it, to insert clauses retaining forever the right
to alter, repeal or amend the charters of their corporations.
^The construction of the certificate will be made more
strongly in favor of the state, because the state, in issuing the
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franchise is assumed to be conserving its own interests rather
than the interests of the corporation, as between the two. But
a third person cannot attack the regularity of the certificate of
incorporation, nor can this be attacked collaterally in any New
Jersey court.
^When. duly executed and filed with and accepted by the
Secretary of State, the Certificate of Incorporation becomes the
charter of the corporation and gives to it all of the powers which
are permitted to her corporations by New Jersey's constitution,
the federal constitution, the statutes of the state, the
certificate of incorporation and by implied and derived authority.
The specific powers granted by the general business companies
law are, in general, to have succession in corporate form forever;
to sue and to be sued under its corporate name without reference
to the individual members; to make and use a common seal in about
the same manner as it is used by a natural person; to hold, buy
and sell property for the purposes for which the company was
authorized, except real estate, which is somewhat restricted for
reasons of public policy; to appoint officers and agents, who are
the only means a corporation has of executing any transaction;
to make by-laws for the guidance of members, but not for outsiders;
and to wind up and dissolve itself when two-thirds of its stock
sees fit to do so. Among the additional and implied powers
derived from common law, precedent and custom, are to make
donations to charities which would assist in building up the
character of the business; to make guarantees in furtherance of
corporate ends, but not otherwise; to make the best of a situation
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even though in so doing it engage in irregular occupations, such
as a hank engaging in shipping; and the investment and utilization
of surplus funds, (hut not surplus profits) outside of the usual
business operations.
"''If other powers are exercised than those given or
implied by the state, they are necessarily ultra vires. This
means simply that the power is legitimate as exercised by a
natural person, and is not unlawful or contrary to public policy,
but is beyond the powers conferred or implied to the corporation.
Thus an act may be ultra vires if authorized by the board of
directors, when a vote of two-thirds of the outstanding stock
would make the act perfectly regular. Examples of such acts are
over issue of stock, reduction of stock, changes in the status
of stockholders and contracts affecting real estate. If
properly authorized, however, a New Jersey corporation may grant
easements on real estate, issue and accept negotiable instruments
in due course of business, and vote through its agents the shares
in another corporation held by it for investment or control.
Thers is no implied power to carry on business outside the state
of New Jersey; if desired this must be expressed in the certificate
2
of incorporation. A provision that the corporation should have
power to carry on business in all states except New Jersey would
not be sustained by the courts of other states, as this would be
exceeding the bounds of amity which causes one state to recognize
the corporations of her sister states 'creation. ^New Jersey
corporations are also prohibited from pleading usuary, from
engaging in banking operations and from entering into partnerships,

-16-
except with other creditors with respect to their claims against
a common debtor only.
The essential features of the certificate of incorporation
are the name of the corporation to be formed "by it, which must
not be the same or similiar to the name of another corporation;
the location of its principal or registered office in New Jersey,
which must be in charge of an agent upon whom legal instruments
can be served; the names of the incorporators, who must be
natural persons and citizens of the United States, but not
necessarily citizens of New Jersey; the amounts of the
subscriptions of the incorporators, which must not be less than
one thousand dollars, and the time for which the corporation is
formed, usually forever. The certificate may be so extended as to
provide for the classification of directors, cumulative voting,
election by ballot or by vive voce, qualifications, powers and
duties of directors, manner of calling and conducting meetings,
voting rights of stockholders, number of stockholders or directors
to form a quorum at their respective meetings, and the
classification, status and voting or other rights of all classes
of capital obligations issued.
There is no statutory limit upon the amount of debts
which a New Jersey corporation may obligate itself to pay. The
theory of some legislatures that the aggregate of debts should
not exceed the aggregate of capital on the supposition that the
capital stock is the trust fund from which the creditors must look
for the payment of their claims is not altogether sound because
in ordinary mercantile transactions the creating of debts occurs
through the acquiring of assets, and the creditors must look to
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the realization of these assets for the liquidation of their
claims. The capital and surplus profits of a corporation must "be
looked upon merely as a factor of safety as to the sufficiency
of the assets, when realized in the ordinary course of "business, to
pay the claims against the corporation. The ratio of the factor
of safety to the total of claims to "be protected is not
necessarily as one to one; it is for the creditors to decide the
proper ratio and to decline to extend credit, when in their
opinion it is exceeded, and a sufficient pledge is not put up
by the corporation. It should not "be the function of the state to
decide this question for the corporation, as it does not do so
for the individual, except in the case of financial institutions,
whose peculiar position makes it necessary to have them examined
by public officials, in order that they may not follow unsound
business methods or prey upon people who are not able to
distinguish such institutions.
^During the last decade there has been a constant
competition between the states of New York and New Jersey for the
commercial and financial advantages to be derived from incorporat-
ing the great modern industrial enterprises. New York has one
advantage which she should not have, according to more advanced
ideas of jurisprudence. She can, and in several instances has,
incorporated companies under special acts of the state legislature,
with powers far exceeding those of New Jersey or of any other
state supposed to be favorable to large corporations. In most
matters of law, education, public administration and business,
New York is the leader among all of the states of the union. But
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in her relation to her corporations and to those of other states she
has shown a singular lack of reasoning, attempting to get the
"business "by retalitory and underhand methods, rather than "by an
open, equitable and consistent policy, such as New Jersey has
followed. The cities of Hoboken and Newark, New Jersey, are so
far as "business interests are concerned, part of the City of New
York, the undisputed financial and industrial center of North
America, so that it is easy for New York promoters to cross over
to a New Jersey trust company's office to establish their corporate
domicile. In her attempt to attract "business from New Jersey,
New York has reduced her franchise tax from one eighth to one
twentieth of one per cent, on the authorized capital, reduced the
amount of publicity required, except when demanded by a creditor
or stockholder, enlarged borrowing powers, permitted stock to be
issued for property other than cash, permitted the issue of
special classes of stock and partially paid stock and enlarged
the powers of corporations in general. These changes have not been
successful in their object; New York Corporations continue to
incorporate in New Jersey.
The criticism of New York's attitude, which are conversely
praises of that of New Jersey, are that her code is incomplete
and chaotic, special charters are granted, often under circumstanc-
es of legislative pressure, as in the case of the Western Electric
Company, the certificate of incorporation is not so complete and
does not take the place of a special act of the state legislature,
as in New Jersey, and the New York laws have no provisions as to
business outside the state of New York or retalitory taxation on
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states not giving suitable privileges to her corporations.
1. Machen, Modern law of Corporations, Vol. I, Boston, 1908
2. Smith's Cases on Private Corporations, Vol. II,
Cambridge, 1902.
3. Laws Relating to Business Companies, Secretary of
State, Camden, N. J., edition of 1908.
4. Dill, Some Aspects of New Jersey's Corporate Policy,
Pen. 1903.
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CHAPTER IV
THE OWNERSHIP OE THE CORPORATION
^ A subscription is an offer made "by an individual to
purchase stocks or "bonds of an existing or proposed corporation,
A corporation cannot, in its own name, make such an offer for the
original issue, although it may later become the vendee. The
acceptance of an offer to subscribe by the corporation or by its
promo tors is an allot tment, or promise to issue shares in return
for the expressed consideration. If the offer is made first by
the promoters, the acceptance by the prospective stockholder makes
the contract binding. Mutual subscriptions are sufficient to bind
the contract within the meaning of the seventeenth section of the
common law statute of frauds. Payment for shares is not necessary
in order to give the subscriber a right to vote and otherwise act
as a member of the corporation, unless a provision restricting
unpaid subscribers rights is inserted in the certificate of
incorporation or the by-laws, but if the subscriber does not
comply with the exact terms of his subscription, his shares may
be sold, or he may be sued as on any action for debt, for he is
simply the common law debtor of the corporation for the amount
of his unpaid subscription. If the corporation relieves him from
the payment of a portion of his subscription, and issues stock
which recites upon its face the usual provision that it is fully
paid and non-assessible , it cannot collect the balance from the
original or transferee holder, although in case of insolvency the
receiver may, upon the order of the court go behind the nominal
payment and collect the balance due to the creditors.
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2 The New Jersey law prevents a misuse of the director's
power to make calls, which was formerly a dangerous power of
strong capitalists over the small holders for investment purposes
,
"by requiring thirty days notice that the sums are required to be
paid into the corporation's treasury, "before any action can be
taken to collect unpaid installments. This prevents the directors
from causing the stock of the small investor to be thrown on the
market at a sacrifice, because he cannot meet the demand of sudden
calls.
Uncalled subscriptions cannot be mortgaged or sold under
any circumstance by the corporation, but after the thirty days
legal notice has expired, the unpaid portion may be disposed of
or the subscriptions cancelled if so provided in the original
contract. Stock cannot be assessed beyond its par value, as has
been done in other states. Subscribers are entitled to a certifi-
cate showing their status as such, which the corporation is obliged
to transfer, if presented for that purpose properly endorsed, with
all called assessments paid in full.
Subscriptions may, with the consent of the corporation,
be paid for in money or property, but not in services. The reason
for this restriction is that the value of services is hard to
determine, and almost any value could be put upon them by the
promoter, at the expense of prospective stockholders and creditors.
'If property is used in making such payments, it must be of such a
nature that it is necessary to the business of the corporation.
If a loan is made to a stockholder to assist him in paying for
his stock, all assenting directors become personally jointly and
severally liable for the unapid amount, and the interest thereon.
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Goodwill may be made the basis for the issue of stock in
the same manner as other property, but it must be a genuine
capitalization of past profits and future prospects, and not
simply promoter's profits paid by himself to himself. If the
promoter buys a piece of property and re transfers it at an advance
in price to a corporation of his creation, without explaining the
transaction to other stockholders, he may be compelled to account
for his profit on the transaction. But if the profit is known
beforehand to the other subscribers, he is entitled to it. The
usual methods for a promoter to dispose of the capital obligations
of a corporation are through inside interests, the stock exchange,
financial houses and by direct appeal to the public. In order to
dispose of an issue of any magnitude, through any of these
channels, it is usually necessary to sell at a price considerably
below par. With the bonds of a New Jersey corporation there is no
difficulty here, for the state recognizes the fact that the
discount on bonds issued is simply additional interest paid in
advance, which must be amortized during the period for which the
bond continues in force, but cannot be issued at a price less than
par without subjecting the subscriber to personal liability in
case of insolvency of the corporation. This liability follows
the stock also, so that subsequent holders are also liable for
the difference between the price paid to the corporation for the
stock and its par value, although their is a difference in their
liability in that it ceases upon a bona fide transfer for value,
while that of the original subscriber cannot be avoided in this
way. A common trick of the promoter to avoid this difficulty is
for him to cause all of the stock to be issued for property, and
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to donate a sufficient amount of this stock back to the corporation
as "working capital". Stock so donated and reissued does not carry
with it any personal liability, and can therefore be sold at a
price below par to advantage. The courts are beginning, however,
to show a tendency to go behind such fictions, and to consider
the true facts. It must be said to New Jersey's credit that if
stock is issued for property or any consideration other than cash,
this fact must be reported in such a manner that the public has
access to the information.
Meetings of the stockholders of a New Jersey corporation
must be held at the principal or registered office of the
corporation, the location of which is set forth in the certificate
of incorporation, and cannot be changed without legal formality
and notice. The usual location for the registered office of a
large corporation not having its industrial headquarters in the
state is at some trust company. There are many of these trust
companies which make a speciality of corporation business, and
provide quarters, minute books, supplies and clerical and
professional services to their clients for this purpose. The
law requires that the name of the corporation shall be displayed
prominently at this registered business, so these trust companies
sometimes have hundreds of signs at their entrances. An employee
of the trust company alsq acts as agent in charge of this office,
thus saving the corporation the expense of keeping an employee of
its own there. If for any reason a corporation fails to provide
itself with a registered office, or fails to have an agent in
charge of it upon whom legal processes can be served, such
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processes can "be served upon the secretary of state, and this
service is made "by statute equivalent to service upon the corpor-
ation. The trust company usually acts as transfer agent and in
other capacities also, as required by the corporation. The charge
for these services are comparatively small, as the duties
involved are not usually heavy.
The first, or organic meeting of the incorporators, which
meets here after the certificate of incorporation has "been filed,
is for the purpose of electing directors and to draw up and adopt
a 3et of "by-laws for their guidance and to define and limit their
powers and duties. In some cases, where there is no conflict of
interest between the directors and the stockholders, the power to
make, alter and amend the by-laws is delegates to the directors.
When this is done, the stockholders still have the right to alter
the by-laws when they see fit to do so.
In order that the stockholders may know who is eligible
to vote at their meeting, which might often involve matters of
considerable importance, the law requires that an alphabetical
list, to be compiled annually or oftener, of all stockholders
and their respective holdings, shall be kept at the registered
office, where the stockholders, but not the director's meetings
muBt be held. However, neither the alphabetical list at the
registered office nor the stock ledger is the proper evidence to
introduce in case of a dispute as to voting rights. They are only
a convenient abstract and analysis of the corporate books;
original records must be made use of here as elsewhere in legal
controversies, and the transfer must be traced back to the stock
transfer book and the s tock certificate book. The alphabetical
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list would of course "be used unless its veracity were challenged.
2
The statute expressly grants to stockholders the right to
vote their stock either in person or "by proxy, and makes the
voting in proportion to the number of shares held. The certificate
of incorporation may further provide that voting shall be
cumulative, that is that all of a stockholders shares may be
voted on one man or distributed over several, at his pleasure,
his total vote being the product of the number of his shares
times the number of candidates for the positions vacant on the
board of directors. The certificate of incorporation can also
provide that voting rights can be restricted as the number of
shares held by an individual increases, but this provision is not
very successful because of the readiness of the large interests
to introduce dummies to hold, nominally, part of their stock,
wjiile serving their interests. Both cumulative voting and
restricted voting rights for large interests are intended to
protect minority stockholders, or at least to give them
representation on the board of directors. If votes could not
be cumulated, the smaller interests might never even know
the transactions at the board meetings or the true financial
condition of the company.
The right of stockholders to vote their stock by proxy
if it is not convenient for them to be present in person cannot
be abbrogated by any provision made by the corporation itself.
This is good in that it conserves the interests of those who
cannot be present, but in practically every large corporation the
conditions are such that very few stockholders live in or near
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the city where the registered office is located. Officers and
directors of the corporation often solicit the proxies of these
persons, which are usually easy to get, and make use of them to
further their own private ends and to perpetuate themselves in
office. No remedy for this evil has as yet "been found except by
creating a voting trust which really represents the true interests
2
of the s tockholders. Within reasonable limits, where the stock
of only one corporation, or of more than one non-competing
corporation is tied up, have "been held legitimate in the state of
x
New Jersey. ^Sometimes assignable certificates, having much the
nature of stock certificates are issued by the trustees or
directors of the voting trust showing that the owner has a right
to receive dividends and dispose of his interest if he so desires,
but that the voting rights of his shares have been delegated for
a certain period. The essential features of a voting trust are
an irrevocable proxy for a limited period of time and a
separation of beneficial and voting rights. The desirability of
this separation is wholly a matter of corporate, and not public
policy. Voting trusts may, however, be made an additional means
for securing control by undesirable interests, if the trustees
are not men who will put the interests of those who have the
equitable ownership of the stock before their own.
The usual provisions of a New Jersey voting trust are that
all stock certificates shall be turned over to the trustees in
exchange for trust certificates, the original stock certificates
to be deposited with a trust company or other depositary. The
term of the trust is set forth, the status of the stockholder,

the form of the trust certificate, the names of the trustees and
the manner of their election and filling vacancies in their
number, the manner of making transfers, the payment of dividends,
and the time and manner of the termination of the trust.
One of the principal objects of a voting trust is to
protect minority interests by placing all or nearly all of the
capital stock in the hands of the voting trustees, who are men who
can be depended upon to be impartial to the interests of both
majority and minority stockholders. Even where no one interest
in a large corporation has a majority, it often happens that
because the stock is widely scattered a small interest may serve
to secure control, so that if only one third of the stock is held
in trust, by trustworthy men, investors will have more faith in
the enterprise, and will consequently be more ready to back it
financially.
^Certificates of stock are but convenient quasi-negotiable
evidences of the ownership of stock, and are not themselves the
stock, as we come to think through handling them. One may be a
shareholder without such evidence of the fact, but if he is a
shareholder he is entitled to this written evidence. A share of
stock represents the right which its owner of record has in the
management and profits of the corporation; a stock certificate is
a mere voucher, or receipt, ordinarily signed by the president
and treasurer of the corporation, and standing as prima facie
evidence of the ownership of the s took. The provision on the
face of the standard stock certificate that it is transferable
only upon the books of the corporation is for the protection of
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the corporation and does not affect outsiders who may have pur-
chased the stock. It is necessary for the corporation to know
to whom it should pay dividends and give voting rights at
stockholders meetings. The ease with which ownership of shares
in a corporation may he transferred is one of the great
advantages of the corporate form of organization.
^In New Jersey, trust, companies act as transfer
agents for corporations in a large number of cases. They are
probably better equipped than any one else for this work, as they
have facilities for the clerical work required, and do a
sufficiently varied business in this line to make them competent
to meet and properly handle any contingency which may arise in
the course of stock issues and transfers. There are a great
many technical questions which arise in making transfers, owing
to the peculiar legal position of the stock certificate, which
is negotiable in that its ownership passes by proper endorsement,
but is non-negotiable in that the new owner can acquire by
transfer no better title than was possessed by the transferee.
Where a reputable trust company has the function of
transferring the stock of a corporation, it practically
guarantees to the public that the corporation is regularly formed
under the laws of the state, that the particular stock issue is
authorized and is not overissued and that the certificate issued
is what it purports to be. In order to do this, it requires from
the corporation all minutes, by-laws, certificates, forms and
signatures which bear upon the matter, properly certified and
approved by an attorney. The money spent upon the transfer agent
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of this kind for its services is returned "by the absence of loss
through clerical and legal errors in making transfers, and the
advantage to the public in having a well known place in a
financial center for such transactions. The position of a
registrar of stock is quite similar to that of a transfer agent,
but it simply certifies that the stock is not overissued. This
certification is required by the New York Stock exchange.
2A New Jersey corporation can issue practically what it
pleases in the way of common stock, preferred stock, guaranteed
stock and convertable stock, if its members so desire and take the
proper legal steps necessary to authorize the issue. Preferred
stock may not be issued in excess of two- thirds of the total
capitalization, nor can bonds be issued which are convertable
into stock of any class, since this would impair the right of
present stockholders to participate in the issue of an increase
of s tock, which they now enjoy.
Common stock is stock which enjoys only the ordinary
voting and dividend receiving qualities which have not been
transferred to other classes of obligations. All corporations
must have common stock, that is stock which has no special
privileges or preferrment. In the case of many of the larger
consolidations, it represents merely a capitalization of future
earnings, which may or may not be realized according to the
condition of the industry or of the protection granted by the
tariff. This so-called "water" is often retained, by the promoters
as their profit, which is therefore contingent upon the ultimate
results of the venture, as it should be. Very often, also
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common stock is given as a "bonus with higher ranking obligations,
without charge, in order that the preferred stock or "bondholder
may realize some of the hoped for profits in return for the risk
he is taking at the outset, and in order that he may have something
to say in the management of the corporation. Some smaller
corporations are so promoted that the promoter is able to keep
all of the common stock for his profit, and so to control the
corporation after realizing all of the value of the property.
J Preferred stock is issued in order to secure working
capital, or in a reorganization, or consolidation in order to
recognize the superior claims of one class of owners over
another in the division of earnings up to a certain point.
Preference is given either as to voting rights, dividend rights,
or first claim on assets upon dissolution. Any one of these or
all three may "be given, the status of the preferred stockholder
usually being shown upon the face of his stock certificate, in
order that the owner may know exactly what his advantages are
without the trouble of referring to the original instrument
conferring them.
The term "guaranteed stock" is sometimes used to denote
stock upon which the issuing corporation has promised to pay a
certain rate of dividend in the future, but this is an ambiguous
use of the term, as such dividends cannot be paid unless earned.
The proper use for the term is to denote stock which has been
issued by one corporation and the dividends on which have been
guaranteed by another for some valid consideration. A New Jersey
corporation may so guarantee the stock of another corporation

-31-
only if it has "been authorized by a two thirds vote of its
stockholders, and the guarantee is in furtherence of its own
corporate objects, as in the case of plants leased for a long
tern of years. Such a guarantee, often entered into "by railroad
corporations, amounts practically to a rental, and is different
therefrom only in order to comply with the corporate form of the
lessee and to carry through the payment of the rent with the
greatest facilities.
The "bond issue of a New Jersey corporation is a matter of
corporate finance, and is not in any way restricted by the law,
except in that the consent of the stockholders should be secured
before the issue is floated, as t his is probably outside of the
powers of the board of directors. It is not mandatory to get
this consent, but rather a matter of custom and of consulting the
wishes of the stockholders. There are innumerable classes of
bonds, named according to some of their peculiar features, terms
of payment, purpose and mode of redemption. The usual consider-
ation in issue ing them is the probability or the success of the
venture. In one of a speculative nature, it is necessary to
create a very small bond issue, as otherwise the public will not
buy it for fear the corporation will not be able to meet the
payments.
b Beyond the participation in the election of directors,
whom he can trust to look after his interests in the ownership of
the corporation, and the passing of by-laws to restrict and
define the powers and duties of these agents, the rights of a
New Jersey stockholder are very limited. The power of making,
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altering and repealing is inherent in the stockholders, "but is
often delegated by them to the hoard of directors, where it still
remains subject to the will of the stockholders. The stockholders
are protected by law from an irrevocable power given to the board
of directors for this purpose. By-laws may be made to cover
almost any phase of the corporations business, but may not alter
the status of stockholders without their consent, nor can they
enlarge the powers of the corporation as conferred by the state,
for this is a function of the state itself.
There is a general principle that by-laws are binding and
confer rights and liabilities upon members, but not upon creditors
who have no knowledge of them, nor upon outsiders. The usual
provisions are in respect to the number of directors, management
of the corporate property, regulation and government of the
affairs of the company, time and place of holding the annual
meeting, classification of directors, election of officers,
duties of officers, vacancies in the board of directors,
qualifications of stockholders voting rights, quorums of
stockholders and of directors, qualifications of directors and
regulations as to dividends.
4 Stockholders have a right to inspect the books and
records of the corporation in order to learn its financial and
physical condition, but this right is neither unqualified nor
unlimited; the application for permission to do this must be for
a proper purpose and must be made by the stockholder with respect
to his interests as such which are not adverse to the corporation,
and with a view to his status as a stockholder in the particiilar
corporation.
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In addition to their rather limited managerial rights,
stockholders are also entitled to dividends, "but only when sums
have "been set aside from the profits of the corporation for such
distribution. It is a peculiarity of the New Jersey Business
Companies Law that all profits earned must be distributed unless
the stockholders acquiesce in the reservation of a portion of
them. This is usually done, either through a by-law provision or a
clause in the certificate of incorporation, because otherwise a
corporation might be compelled to make considerable payments when
to do so would cause it financial embarrassment, through the
profits being accrued but not realized in cash or other cause.
When the capitalization of a New Jersey corporation is to
be increased, the directors must submit the matter to the
stockholders for their vote, because otherwise their status might
be changed without their consent, and this would be contrary to
the law. If the stock is to be increased, except for the purpose
of exchanging the additional amount for specific property, the
stockholders also have a right to participate pro rata in the
increase according to their holdings in the former issues.
Preferred stockholders would have no superior rights here over
common stockholders, in the absence of specific provisions
regarding the matter, but they would have a right to object to
any shares being created having equal or greater privileges than
their own. Failure of the directors to recognize the right of
the old stockholders to participation in the new issue which they
have authorized does not invalidate the new issue, but is simply
grounds for damages from the corporation for the loss to the old
stockholder.

- 34-
5
The bond issues, like the stock issues, of the larger
New Jersey corporations are usually recorded and handled by New
Jersey trust companies. The object of having a trust company
of repute acting in this fiduciary capacity is to insure to
prospective purchasers that the issue is perfectly regular and
authorized, that it is not overissued, and that all stipulations
as to payments into sinking funds, payments of interest and
payments of principal have been carried out, and that the property
is protected by proper inspection and insurance. The trust
company examines all papers relating to the trust deed, including
the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, minutes of stockholders
and directors, specimens of signatures to be placed on bonds,
opinion of attorney regarding regularity of issue and papers
regarding the ownership and value of the property to be mortgaged
"by the trust deed. A bond is simply a fractional part of a
mortgage or trust deed, and as such is entitled to all of the
advantages and security there set forth. Each bond, as issued
by the corporation is countersigned by the trust company, which
acts somewhat in the capacity of a registrar of stock.
5 In the management of a corporation, the most difficult
thing for the stockholders of a corporation to do is to protect
themselves from misinformation and manipulation by their directors
and other trusted agents. The New Jersey code does not attempt to
regulate the internal control of her corporations, except in
one or two instances, such as providing for cumulative voting
and reserving the right to make by-laws to the s tockholders, nor
does she interfere through her courts, except in extreme cases
where actual fraud on the part of the management against the

-35-
owners can "be shown "by the latter. The remedy of the dissatisfied
stockholder is to elect new directors who will carry on the
business according to his wishes, or if he has not the power to
do this, to sell his stock. The control of the corporation often
is a vital factor in the value of shares of stock to the purchaser,
because, if dishonest he can benefit himself greatly at the
expense of minority stockholders by making contracts to his own
advantage, paying him a large salary for his services as an
officer of the corporation or by transfering the profitable side
of the business to a subsidiary corporation of his own ownership,
which will divert profits to his own pockets, and if honest by
protecting himself from such abuses. For such misuses of
corporate control, which are not a defect of the law necessarily,
but a part of the state's policy, the remedy must be found in a
wider knowledge of the rights of stockholders and the means of
protecting these rights by an independent audit by a Certified
Public Accountant who is not secured by the board of directors, but
by the stockholders themselves, by accounting hethods which can
be relied upon to give correct results, by carefully drawn
provisions of the certificate of incorporation and by-laws
limiting and defining the powers of the board of directors, and by
aboiding investments in corporations which may be subject to inside
manipulation.
1. Machen, Modern Law of Corporation. Volume I.
2. General Corporation Act of New Jersey, edition of 1910.
3. Lough, Corporation Finance.
4. Smith's Cases on Private Corporation. Volume I.
5. Herrick, Trust Companies.
0. Conyngton, Corporate Management.
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CHAPTER V
THE MANAGEMENT OP THE CORPORATIONS
^"Section twelve of the New Jersey Business Companies Law
provides that "the business of every corporation shall he managed
"by its directors," and the courts have held that any attempt at a
form of organization which substitutes another form for this one
is illegal. A small close corporation recently tried to secure the
advantages of "both the corporate and the partnership form of
organization by forming a partnership among its members for the
ownership of the shares of stock in the corporation. In this
case the courts went behind the fiction, and decided the question
of liability on the primary facts.
If it is desired by the stockholders to limit in any way
the power of the directors as conferred by statute and by custom,
they must make provisions to that effect in the certificate of
incorporation or the by-laws. If the provision were placed in
the certificate of incorporation, it would of course have
more effect than in the by-laws. In the absence of such
restrictive provisions, the ordinary executive acts of the
directors are binding unless actual fraud on the part of the
board or of some of its members can be shown. The members of the
board have no power as individuals, unless they are authorized
by the board to act as its agents. In order to have affect,
the action of the board must be recorded, and the directors must
be present in person. Stockholders have the right by statute
to delegate their voting rights to proxies, but the directors
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function is altogether personal in him, and cannot be delegated.
2
In the absence of provisions to the contrary, the board may
transact "business when a majority of its members are present, and
a majority of this quorum, can bind the corporation by its
action. The meetings need not be held in the State of New Jersey,
if the proper provisions for holding them elsewhere are inserted
in the certificate of incorporation.
The board is the primary possessors of all powers conferred
on the corporation by the state, and is therefore, by the fiction
of law, the corporation itself, and can act as such, but the
directors are not trustees for the stockholders in that the
corporate property rights are vested in the corporate entity,
and not in the directors as individuals. ^"The law provides no
qualifications for membership on the board of directors beyond
the candidate being a stockholder of record on the books of the
corporation. When a director ceases to be a stockholder, he
thereupon ceases to be a director, without further action. It
is, customary however, for the board of directors to pass a
resolution declaring the office vacant, in electing a new member
to it. The board of directors has the power to fill vacancies
in its membership caused in this way or by resignation, but not
those caused by the ordinary lapse of the term of office of a
member, or by an increase in the number of directors.
Since the election of directors by the stockholders is for
the representation of their interests on the board, it follows
that they may be classified so as to be elected by the various
classes of stockholders, or, in extreme cases, their election
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may even fall upon bond holders, in case of default of payments
due them. The liberal policy of the state in allowing corpora-
tions to create various classes of capital obligations also
extends to the control through the board of directors of the
property exchanged for them.
"^Three officers are essential to the organization of every
New Jersey corporation; a president, a secretary and a treasurer.
These may act either for the board or the stockholders, or for
both. It is optional with the stockholders to elect separate
officers for themselves from their own number, or to adopt those
elected by the board of directors as their own, which is the cus-
tum more often followed. The statute provides very few
regulations as to these officers; it leaves the provisions
limiting and defining their powers and duties largely to the
by-laws of the corporation, ot in other words to the stockholders
primarily and to the directors directly.
The power is also given to chose such other officers,
agents and employees as may be necessary for carrying on the
company's business. Their powers are those of agents, that is
conferred powers, and the usual laws of agency apply to them in
all respects as though they were acting for a natural person,
but the corporation cannot of course confer upon its agent powers
in excess of those which it has itself received from the state.
Powers which are inherent in an officers or agent's office may
sometimes be assumed to be conferred upon an officer or agent,
when this has not been done, and may bind the corporation.
The president of a corporation is its chief executive
officer^, and may bind it in the usual course of business, where a
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contract under seal entered into "by the corporation itself, i.e.
by the "board of directors, is not altered by his action. For any
extraordinary act, such as the conveyance of real estate, express
authority from the board of directors is necessary in order to
bind the corporation.
The duties of the secretary are to keep a record of all
corporate action on the part of the directors and stockholders,
to affix and attest the corporate seal and to take charge of stock
transfers, when no transfer agent is provided for this purpose.
The treasurer has charge of corporate funds, and signs
various ins truments jointly with the president. Other duties may
also be assigned to these or other agents at the will of the
board of directors.
1. Laws relating to Business Companies, edition of 1910,
Camden, 1910.
2. Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, Boston 1908.
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CHAPTER VI
DISSOLUTION
"^The power to wind up and dissolve itself is one of the
specific powers conferred by law upon New Jersey corporations.
There are seven ways "by which this dissolution may he brought
about; by the expiration of the time named in the certificate of
incorporation; by surrender of the corporate franchise; voluntary
dissolution by the stockholders and directors; legislation;
decree of a court for insolvency; forfeiture of charter for
failure to bring books into state; and by proclamation of the
governor for failure to pay tazes.
When the formal dissolution has taken place, it is
necessary to realize the property of the corporation and to
liquidate its liabilities. Any balance remaining must be
distributed to the stockholders of record according to their
claims. Preference stockholders have no superior claims upon
winding up, unless this is part of their contract with the
corporation. If the property were disposed of and the debts
paid without going through one of the seven forms of dissolution
as enumerated above, the corporation would continue to exist in
the eyes of the law, the members of the corporation would be
personally liable for any liquidating dividends paid to themselve
and the corporation could be held to continue to exist by any one
2
who desired to do so. Even where the forms of the law for
dissolution are complied with, the corporation remains in
existence as a legal entity for the purpose of settling its
affairs, but not for carrying on the business permitted by its
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charter, unless this is incidentally necessary to the adjustment
of its business. For the purpose of dissolving the corporation,
the directors of the corporation become elective trustees, and
may act at their option either in their own name, as such, or in
the name of the corporation. They are trustees both for the
members of the corporation and for those who have claims to be
liquidated. They are given sufficient latitude in their duties
to enable them to make the best possible bargain for those whose
interests they represent, and do not become personally liable for
their acts if they follow the direction of the statute and the
courts, and act in good faith, without undue advantage to
themselves. The election of directors or trustees may take place
after the corporation has been formally dissolved, and even after
becoming insolvent, the stockholders may hold such an election,
if the court so orders. It is however, optional for the court
to appoint a receiver to supersede the ordinary machinery of the
corporation, if this is necessary to conserve the interests of
the creditors, or if the trustees action does not seem to bring
about the complete dissolution quick enough. The receiver must
realize the property, and distribute it pro rata first to the
preferred creditors, then to the ordinary claim3, and lastly to
the equitable owners of the balance.
When a corporation becomes insolvent, or it becomes
desirable to dissolve it, a resolution is passed by the board of
directors, who must thereupon call a meeting of the stockholders,
unless the dissolution is by expiration of the time limit in the
certificate of incorporation, in which case they may proceed
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without such action. At this meeting, the full facts as to the
assets and liabilities of the corporation must he stated to the
stockholders, and the reasons for desiring the dissolution of the
corporation.
-'A corporation may not become a voluntary "bankrupt
under the National Bankruptcy Law, hut when it is found that the
appointment of a court receiver is the only method of escaping
financial difficulties, a friendly receiver can usually be
secured by a petition brought by creditors whose interests are
those of the corporation. A corporation is not necessarily
insolvent because its capital stock is considerably impaired
by losses; the proof of insolvency accepted by the court is the
inability of the corporation to meet the demands of creditors.
^An attempt to mortgage or convey the property of a corporation
in process of dissolution to the preferment of one creditor over
another is not valid, but receiver's certificates may be issued
if it is necessary to raise funds to protect the property, or to
render it saleable and these constitute preferred claims over all
others.
It is optional with the court, when the debts of the
corporation are satisfied, to cause the dissolution of an
insolvent corporation, or to turn the affairs over to the
stockholders for reorganization.
1. General Corporation Act of New Jersey, edition of 1910.
2. Machen, Modern Law of Corporation.
3. National Bankruptcy Law of the United States, Washington, 1898.
4. Lough, Corporation Finance.
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CHAPTER VII
TAXATION AND PUBLICITY
^Besides the recent federal corporation income tax and
such excise and import duties as its line of "business may entail,
a New Jersey corporation pays in the state of its domicile three
classes of taxes; the ordinary real and personal property tax,
such as is paid "by all property owners in the state, the fees to
the secretary of state and the county recorder of deeds for
filing certain papers aaad. for making their organization complete
or altering it; and the franchise tax for the privilege of
continueing as a corporation, payable annually.
The property tax need not be considered here because it
is not directed especially towards corporations, and need not "be
paid by them except on property in the state of New Jersey. The
same exemptions are given to corporations as to the taxation of
both physical property and the obligations issued against it.
Shares of stock in the hands of s tockholders are not taxable if
outside the state of New Jersey.
Special fees for the filing of the various formal documents
required by the state are specified by the corporation law, or if
not specified amount to five dollars. The fee for recording in
duplicate in the office of the secretary of state all certificates
of incorporation of domestic corporations is ten cents per
hundred words, the minimum amount of any fee to be one dollar.
The other fees range from one dollar to twenty-five dollars, in
some cases varying with the capitalization, butthe amount is such
that in a corporation of any considerable size they are not
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material disadvantages to New Jersey corporation organization.
The fees payable to the Secretary of State and to the County
Recorder of deeds are mainly to cover the cost of the service
rendered by them, and are not at all excessive for the trouble
and detail involved.
The competing trust and other companies of the various
states favorable to incorporation have published from time to
time comparative statements of the cost of franchise taxes in
their states, each trying to show that its own was the most
favorable, in order to get the profitable business of acting as
organizer and agent in the state. The figures published by
these promoters do not apparently agree, and also vary widely
2
according to the capitalization. Those published by the Delaware
Charter Guarantee and Trust Company can probably be relied upon
as accurate, and are as follows, for the three "incorporating
states" which they cover.
Authorized Capital New Jersey Delaware Maine
$ 25,000.00 25.00 5.00 5.00
50,000.00 50.00 10.00 5.00
75,000.00 75.00 10.00 10.00
100,000.00 100.00 10.00 10.00
500,000.00 500.00 25.00 50.00
1,000,000.00 1,000.00 50.00 75.00
5,000,000.00 4,000.00 150.00 275.00
10,000,000.00 4,250.00 275.00 525.00
This shows some advantage to Delaware, especially for large
corporations, which is doubtless the point it is intended to
bring out, but as a rule, a corporation with a capital of say
five million dollars will be much more interested in the
advantages of the other phases of corporate formation than in
this fee, if it has large objects in view.
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^The degree of publicity which should "be required of a
corporation is still an open question. To place all of the
corporate records at the will of every comer makes it possible
for competitors, who perhaps are not subject to such inspection,
to learn just what the sales of the corporation have been, what
its costs of production are and the chances of throwing it into
bankruptcy by cutting prices and buying the claims against it.
Even if the corporate books are open to stockholders of record
only, there is no protection from this evil, since no large
corporation is so close that there are no stray shares to be
purchased by outsiders, if they are willing to make a sufficiently
high bid for them. The certificate of incorporation should of
course be filed upon the public records, as well as any
amendments or instruments changing the status of the corporation
or its relations to its members or to outsiders, because these
are the only means the outsider ordinarily has for knowing that
he is dealing with a body whose liability is limited and some
acts of which may be ultra vires, and put him in a bad position
when he tries to make use of the courts to enforce his contracts.
New Jersey tries here, as elsewhere in her policy towards
corporations, to secure a sufficient protection of all interests
involved without injuring the interests of the corporation. One
way of protecting stockholders or prospective stockholders is by
the publication of the manner in which the capital stock of
the corporation was paid up. ^If paid in property, as is usual
in combinations, this must be stated in the report. In this
report must be stated also the name of the corporation, the
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location of its principal office, the character of its business,
the amount of its capital stock and the amount issued, the names
and addresses of its directors and officers and the expirations
of their terras of office, the time of the next annual meeting of
stockholders, and a statement as to whether the corporation has
at all times displayed its name at its registered office, and
kept its stock and transfer books within the state of New Jersey.
Suitable, but not impossible penalties are provided for failure
to make this report, including a forfeit of two hundred dollars
to the state, and ineligibility of the directors who are
delinquent for office for a period of one year. The statute
gives detailed instructions for making up this report, specifying
that it must be in the English language and that the secretary of
state must file it and record it by making a typewritten copy
with a record ribbon of permanent color.
1. General Corporation Act of New Jersey, edition of 1910.
2. Delaware Charter Guarantee and Trust Company, advertising
pamphlet for 1909.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE RELATION OP NEW JERSEY CORPORATIONS TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS
The keystone of the relation of corporations to economic
progress lies in the condition that the corporation can bring
together larger aggregations of capital for the promotion of an
industry than can the single trader or the co-partnership and it
can also distribute the risk of failure over a number of indivi-
duals and provide safeguards for the investing and speculating
public which are impossible for the unincorporated. The history
of the industrial development of America is the history of large
corporations. When commerce was first opened, it was the custom
to grant legislative monopolies of the trade with a new colony
to companies of merchant adventures, with very large powers over
the commerce and government of the territory assigned to them.
Public opinion would not tolerate such grants at present, but we
have a close analogy to the position of these corporations in our
capitalistic monopolies of today.
Most modern industrial corporations are organized under New
Jersey laws, and have secured their present position by purchasing
with their gigantic resources the original sources of raw product
in their respective businesses.
Such large corporations usually start by the merger of
a number of the important factors in production of the industry
to be merged. The combination then either buys up or forces into
liquidation its competitors and is in position to control the
industry practically as it pleased, so long as the government does
not interfere. Competition would not prove profitable, and would
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entail a long and bitter fight, and the public would not care to
invest millions in a series of competing plants, where the ulti-
mate outcome is doubtful and no monopoly profits can be reasonably-
expected.
The typical large New Jersey corporation is interested
especially in two phases of corporation law. These are the
provisions permitting one corporation to hold the stocks and bonds
of another, and the merger act. Probably no other laws have had
such a great influence on the economic progress of the United
States as these. Al tough passed by the New Jersey legislature,
they are national in their scope. This point is especially
brought out when we find that over half of all of the securities
dealt in on the New York Stock Exchange are issued by corporations
which are operating under New Jersey charters.
The federation of sovereign powers which forms our Union,
when first formed knew nothing of the corporate development which
was to spring up, and made no provision for its control, but we
are gradually beginning to see that national laws or uniform
state laws are necessary if we are to cope properly with the
changed condition of today. No one can doubt that the uniform
negotiable instruments laws adopted by nearly all states has
been a great benefit to those who must handle business in this
manner. If we could agree on some similar policy towards
domestic and foreign corporation which would be uniform through-
out the United States, the greatest benefit would accrue both
to the corporations and to the state. Such a plan is not altogether
impossible of operation. The fundamental principles of corporate
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legislation have been worked out in the last century, and we also
have the experience of England and Germany to help us formulate
our national or uniform state law. The interests of the various
states are not greatly in conflict on this point; the relation
of corporations to economic progress depends upon their relation
to the State. But the relation to the state varies with the know-
ledge and the whim of legislators.
New Jersey is not a vandal as the uninformed often suppose
,
fostering fraudulant bodies for the gain in franchise taxes; she
has studied the corporate problem from a legal and economic stand-
point by the aid of eminent lawyres and economists and her policy
is probably the fairest to the public and to the members of the
corporation. Her sister states would do better to copy the best
points in her law than to find fault with the worst ones.
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